

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulator and that now that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolutely secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much. As things now are, I feel that you need not have this place on your mind at all. The position of this place on the Army priority lists is still all right, for our essentials can still be quickly supplied when the necessity arises. You know what they and War Plans can refresh your mind.

Am flying back early tomorrow morning to greet Mr. Knox.

Best wishes!

C. D. HANSON.

[All of above hand written.]

[22] Confidential

October 15, 1949

Secret

The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit planes in the air at dawn.

We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will be observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that precautions must increase.

C. D. H.

EXHIBIT NO. 53

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL MARSHALL AND GENERAL SHORT

Date	From	To	Subject	Page ¹
7 Feb	Marshall	Short	Advise to Short on assumption of command	1
19 Feb	Short	Marshall	Planning for Hawaiian Department	4
5 Mar	Marshall	Short	Urging air defense preparations	10
6 Mar	Short	Marshall	Expediting of AWS project requested	11
13 Mar	Marshall	Short	Short's coordination with Navy approved	13
15 Mar	Bryden (Marshall absent)	Short	Need for clearance with Interior on AWS sites	14
15 Mar	Short	Marshall	Report on measures for defense from air attack	15
28 Mar	Marshall	Short	Hawaiian defense needs	18
14 Apr	Short	Marshall	Strong points & new airfield; forwarding Army-Navy air defense plans	19
1 May	Short	Marshall	Requesting funds for airfield construction	21
2 May	Short	Marshall	Amplifying request	23
5 May	Marshall	Short	Acknowledging receipt of air defense plans forwarded 14 April.	25
15 May	Short	Emmons (to Marshall)	Statement on projects of interest to Hawaiian Department.	26
29 May	Short	Marshall	Reporting recent maneuvers	35
3 July	Marshall	Short	Recreation camp	37
11 July	Short	Marshall	Site for new airfield	38
25 July	Short	Marshall	Army-Navy mutual use of airfields; plans for Army-Navy air exercise	39
19 Aug	Marshall	Short	Choice of airfield site	40
10 Oct	Marshall	Short	Missions of air units under Short's tentative SOP	42
14 Oct	Short	Marshall	Same	43
28 Oct	Marshall	Short	Same	44

NOTE.—Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 18 were classified Secret. Items 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 were classified Confidential.

¹Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

[1]

FEBRUARY 7, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications for command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy.

I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday,—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and [2] very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles,

carriers 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

[3] I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited material we have, for Alaska, for Panama, and, *most confidentially* for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel, I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped.] (Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

[4]

FEB. 19, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

Since assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy.
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
- (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
- (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
- (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
- (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
- (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
- (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and aircraft. These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.

[5] *Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.* Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:

Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-O 4-11.

One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (mobile) (less searchlight battery) T. O. 4-15.

Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Antiaircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel, [6] both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery materiel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4-31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This

shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary for the defense of the island.

There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of [7] repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.

Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

Cooperation with the Navy. Joint letter, HHD, 14th Naval District, 14 February, 1941, subject: "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," copy attached, Inclosure No. 1.

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.

Dispersion and protection of aircraft. Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.

Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55, copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.

[8] Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.

North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662/7, 19 February 1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.

Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights.

a. Beach Defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 January 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineers Status Report, Revision, 1940." 1st Indorsement, O. C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: "Reference Par. 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action

is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails. Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.

Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 600.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached) :

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.
3. Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.
5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 14.
6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclosure No. 15.
7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.
8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.
9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.

[9] *Increase in number of Engineer Troops.* Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.

Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
*Lieutenant General,
Commanding.*

19 Incls: ¹

[10]

MARCH 5, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.*

MY DEAR SHORT: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

¹ Omitted.

[11] Via "Clipper" Air Mail

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and has communicated this concern to the Navy Department; as you know, the Secretary of War has advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be received in this department some time in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter. I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within thirty days after receipt of the equipment.

All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941 just received from The Adjutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and a paraphrase of my reply are inclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant General's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not yet been appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain restrictions regarding construction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, the completion of this station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important in the warning net; its commanding location gives it greater coverage than any of the others, and its early completion is vital. I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

[12] Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Walter C. Short
 WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

2 Incls: ¹
 Radio 3 Mar 1941
 Paraphrase

[13]

MARCH 13, 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

Since the Navy development in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming responsibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available.

The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, matériel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating

¹Omitted.

projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including \$3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[14]

MAR. 15, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The matters referred to in your secret letter dated March 6, 1941, and the inclosures thereto, have been given careful study.

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public lands. It is not believed that it would be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through official channels.

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest cooperation.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Signed) WM. BRYDEN.
In the absence of the Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
1 Chief of Staff.

[15]

15 MARCH 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense from air attack.

DISPERSION AND PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better. Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island. On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius.

The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the arrival

of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly congested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at Wheeler Field.

[16] Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Incidentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually at some distance from the air field.

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only 4½ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

The shortage of personnel is much more serious than that of equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO 4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 19th.

COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, commanding the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air Station. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the past [17] month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find out anything that is wrong with the plan.

WEST COAST DEFENSE

If the situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our

air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel that it would be wise to send him also as he would be able to get all the details. If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officers I would like to send their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.

I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this subject.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[18]

MAR 28 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.*

MY DEAR SHORT: I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing the air defense situation in your department.

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes will be included in estimates.

A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available.

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service matériel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3" antiaircraft guns, December, 1941; one hundred and fifteen 37 mm antiaircraft guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR No. 268, April, 1941; five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May 1941.

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft garrison so as to provide full strength units for the armament available within your department. Additional Coast Artillery reinforcements probably will be held in the United States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute.

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Due to various reasons that exercise has been postponed till Fall, as you may know.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Distribution:

1 Copy for the Chief of Staff

[19]

APRIL 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
*Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On April 12th I sent a radio to the War Department requesting that I be authorized to make leases of 230 separate parcels of land, none of which exceed 5 acres on island of Oahu, totaling approximately 467 acres and asking for \$10,000.00 to cover the rental. The purpose in leasing this land is to begin the construction of strongpoints at all places where they are not located in cane fields and pineapple fields. The greater part of the other land is rock so the construction of the strongpoints requires the use of explosives and takes a great amount of time. One company strongpoint on the West Coast is now in the process of being constructed and the troops have been working most of the time for seven months. The strongpoint lacks considerably of being completed. I feel that it is essential to get these under way at once rather than taking several months to get the exact metes and bounds and get the approval of the War Department on each separate lease before starting work. At the best I do not believe they can all be completed before September. Any field fortifications to be constructed in cane fields and pineapple fields will be very simple as the nature of the soil is such that the construction can be carried on without the use of explosives. I am enclosing a copy of the radio sent.

We have completed the reconnaissance and estimates for the new air field. We had some difficulty in meeting all the technical requirements as I was insistent that it should be located somewhere in the interior where it could not be picked up so easily at night, could not be shelled from ships and would not require a special guard. We have located a place that seems to meet all requirements and is exceptionally well located from a tactical point of view. I am enclosing a copy of the letter of transmittal. The complete document is being sent forward to the Adjutant General by this same mail. With the great increase in the number of pursuit planes I feel that it is essential to push this construction as rapidly as possible.

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

[20] 2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Forces, to implement the above agreement.

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some months before my arrival this matter was considered and at that time the conclusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense Exercise in the Fall.

Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to time as matters come up which I think will interest you.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) Walter C. Short.
WALTER C. SHORT.

[21]

From: Honolulu.

To: General George C. Marshall.

Honolulu No. 2755. May 1st.

MAY 2, 1941. 4:39 AM.

Hawaiian Department has submitted estimates for construction of airports for the Hawaiian Air Force as follows: Island of Oahu, Kipapa \$4,940,000.00, Belows Field \$2,543,000.00. Island of Kauai, Barking Sands \$1,772,000.00. Island of Hawaii, Morse Field \$1,688,000.00, Hilo airport \$670,000.00, Parker Ranch \$1,993,000.00, Total \$13,606,000.00. Additional estimates will be submitted for airports as follows: Island of Oahu, Haleiwa \$450,000.00. Island of Kauai, Burns Field \$640,000.00. Island of Molokai, Homestead Field \$400,000.00. Island of Lanai \$1,990,000.00, total \$3,480,000.00. It is recommended that provision be made in the current 1942 appropriation bill for the inclusion of these items at a total estimated cost of \$17,860,000.00.

In addition request that amount of \$10,000,000.00 be included in estimates for use in this Department on projects which can not be completely anticipated at this time. This fund should be available without waiting for future congressional action for projects under construction but lacking sufficient funds to complete, and upon [22] approval for those projects now under study but not yet approved including fortifications, bombproofs, housing, military roads and other structures. Understand fiscal year 42 appropriation bill now before Senate and recommend inclusion of these general amounts before bill passed and sent to conference. Clipper letter follows.

SHORT.

[23]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
*Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: This letter is being written to amplify the requests made in my radiogram of 1 May to you for inclusion of funds in the Fiscal year 1942 estimates now before Congress.

I believe that the two requests made in this radiogram are both necessary to solve the problem existing in this department. The development of adequate airfields for the rapidly expanding Hawaiian Air Force is essential. An effort has been made to develop these fields through use of troop labor and WPA, but this is entirely too slow and uncertain. The projects which have been and are being submitted at a total estimated cost of \$17,086,000 will provide satisfactory operating conditions. Copies of the project letters already submitted are enclosed for ready reference. Our request for the inclusion of \$10,000,000 in these estimates is intended to establish a source of funds which can be drawn upon to finance necessary projects as the need for them occurs. With the rapidly changing situation it is impossible to anticipate all our needs and submit detailed projects for consideration. In addition to this difficulty there have been several instances in the past six months where projects have been submitted and approved by the War Department as desirable and necessary but construction work could not be initiated due to a lack of funds. I think that the situation has progressed to such a point that we can no longer afford the delay in time which has heretofore been required to secure appropriations by Congress after the projects have been approved. I can foresee several requirements this coming year which must be met. Among these are housing for the increases in the garrison, increased storage needs, work on roads, fortifications, gasoline storage (both aviation and motor vehicle), and other requirements. As stated, all of the details cannot be anticipated at this time but some source of funds should be available for their construction without having to wait for congressional action.

If these funds could be secured it would give us an equal opportunity with the Navy. The Navy is apparently getting an allotment of funds without the necessity of submitting detailed projects and as a result they have been able to accumulate required materials and almost corner the local labor market. There has already developed a shipping shortage between the mainland and the islands and the situation in regard to shipping in the present war makes it highly probable that many of the ships now plying between here and the coast may be transferred to trans-Atlantic service and this will make the situation serious. I think it is extremely important that funds be made available without delay for the procurement and shipment to these islands of the materials required in our construction program.

[24] At the time my radio was sent I understood that this appropriation bill was still pending before the Senate and speed in obtaining your consideration of these recommendations was important.

Very sincerely,

/S/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.*

7 Incls: ¹
Letters:

1. Bellows Field (Pursuit and Bombardment)
2. Kipapa Field (Pursuit)
3. Barking Sands Field (Bombardment)
4. Morse Field (Bombardment)
5. Hilo Airport (Bombardment)
6. Parker Ranch (Bombardment)
7. Homestead Field, Molokai (Pursuit)

Letters being submitted later:

1. Burns Field, Kauai (Bombardment)
2. Lanai (Pursuit and Bombardment)
3. Haleiwa, Oahu (Pursuit)

¹ Omitted.

[25]

MAY 5, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time.

I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awhile. Last week the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through the successive sessions of four hours each, which involved answering a barrage of questions on all matters great and small.

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff

In reply refer to:

Pencilled notation of WPD Action

HR. 4545, to provide for Public Works including schools, now pending in Senate.

S. 1313, a bill to provide educational means, now being studied by G-1 preparatory to submitting WD report thereon.

Information furnished by 1st Ind. (5-3-41) to AG 000.73 (4-16-41) M-B.

Activated by G3/45351 (5-29-41). G-1 states no action taken re assignment by Brig. Gen. for AA Brig.

Under study by G-3.

Memorandum for Lieutenant General D. C. Emmons, U. S. A.¹ to Gen. Marshall

The following projects are of vital interest to the Hawaiian Department:

G-1

1. *a.* No action has been taken by the U. S. Commissioner of Education to provide school buildings and facilities for approximately 3,000 children of service personnel and defense workers (Army and Navy combined). Most of the Army children belong to personnel on duty at Air Fields.

b. The Territory of Hawaii has appropriated \$121,294.00 to pay teachers.

G-2

Letter 326.2 (G-2) from Hawaiian Dept to The Adjutant General, dated 16 April 1941, subject: Censorship, Hawaiian Department. Requested information concerning current policy of the War Department regarding Army operation, control and coordination of publicity, propaganda and censorship in this Department, particularly the censorship of mail and local telephone service in case of war in the Pacific area.

G-3

1. Authorization for activation of 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Hq. Battery, and Intelligence Battery, and assignment of Brigadier General to command.

2. Authorization for reorganization of troops in Hawaiian Department:

a. Formation of two triangular divisions.

b. Creation of Air Defense Command.

¹ The words "to General Marshall" are handwritten in the original.

5th Ind (AG 580, 12-12-40) dated 5-10-41 rec'd WPD 5-28-41.
Under study.

Information governing the distribution of controlled items and estimated future delivery dates have been furnished. 100% of requirements for 37mm (AA and AT) guns by May 1942. 60% AP Shot (AT)—Nov. 1941. 60% HE Shell (AA) March 1942.

AG 565.4 (2-11-41) Mar. 27, 1941 informed that funds for 1 barge for Pearl Harbor would be included in next estimate.

AG 561.11 Haw Dept (3-13-41) Apr 26, 1941 approved request for 2 ocean-going barges and 1 ocean-going tug. QMG taking action to procure.

Not rec'd in TAG (6-11-41)

Activation of Tow Target Det. authorized May 29, effective July 1, 1941. (AG 320.2, 5-22-41)

4th Ind (4-18-40) to AG 472.2 (2-10-40) M-WPD. 105mm not available for issue to Haw Dept. Will be issued, when available, in accordance with established priorities.

Action taken by 3d Ind 4-18-41 to AG 600.12 (1-4-41)

AG 600.12 (5-17-41) Under study G-3

3. Provision of facilities for Army bombers, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Canton Islands, and provision for trans-Pacific movements of bombers, if such action is contemplated by the War Department. All installations to be constructed, maintained and defended by Navy.

4. Need for 37mm ammunition and matériel (antiaircraft and anti-tank). (No ammunition and only 20 out of 120 guns now on hand.)

5. Need for more water transportation to outlying islands.

6. Troops and matériel for defense of Kaneohe Air Station. Plans now in preparation (due in Department Headquarters 1 June).

7. Formation of 5th Target Squadron so as to relieve load on tactical units. Increased demands due to doubling antiaircraft garrison will interfere greatly with tactical training of Air Force units.

8. Provision of 105mm howitzers for light regiments of 11th Field Artillery Brigade.

G-4

Quartermaster Projects:

Letter to The Adjutant General, 4 January 1941, which requested \$312,500 for warehousing in Hawaiian Department.

Approved by radio 5-22-41 (AG 600.12) 34th Engineer Camp Mobilization Housing----- \$276,000.00

804th Co., requested 13 May 1941, Scho. Bks----- 34,000.00

Action by radio 4-25-41 AG 672 (4-14-41)
 Action by 3d Ind (6-11-41) AG 671.1 (6-5-41)
 Approved 3d Ind (5-6-41) AG 673.1 (2-13-41)
 Action by 3d Ind (5-6-41) AG 673.1 (2-13-41)
 Latest action—by 3d Ind (9-25-30) WD to HAW Dept AG
 412.34 (9-23-39)

Auth. by radio May 20 #AG 600.12 (4-28-41)
 Action by 5th Ind (5-10-41) #AG 600.12 (3-3-41)
 Auth by QMG May 23 (QM 634 C-EP)
 AG 614 (Haw Dept) (5-16-41) to Ch/AC by 5th Ind (6-5-41)
 Under Study

Under study Ch/AC AG 600.12 (4-8-41).
 Action rec. in Memo Ch/Staff (AC #50) (5-28-41).
 AG 600.12 (5-2-41). Action rec. in Memo Ch/Staff (AC #51) (5-28-41).

AG 580 (5-22-41) to Ch/AC (5-27-41) Under study.

Memo to Ch/Staff
 WPD 2550-22 (6-10-41)

Sewage Disposal, Scho. Bks.....	130,000.00
Water Distribution System, Fort Kamehameha.....	23,000.00
Dry Battery Storage, Fort Shafter.....	3,500.00
Rehabilitation of Transformer Station, Cho. Bks.....	54,000.00

Water Lime for Water Softener, Laundry, Fort Arm- strong.....	1,700.00
G. M. Warehousing, Fort Armstrong.....	92,000.00
Q. M. Warehousing & Utilities, Schofield Barracks.....	164,000.00
Two Fire Stations, Schofield Barracks.....	28,000.00

Survey Bombing Range & Landing Field, Lanai.....	1,800.00
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Engineer
 Important projects which have been submitted to the War Department and on which no reply has been received to date:

a. Airfields:

<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Funds</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Bellows Field, Oahu.....	5 Apr 1941	\$2,542,900	118 Off. 1049 E. M.
Kipapa Field, Oahu.....	14 Apr 1941	4,938,950	15th Pur. Sqn.
Hilo Airport, Hawaii.....	2 May 1941	670,140	1 Bomb. Sqn.
Homestead Field, Molokai.....	2 May 1941	407,600	1 Pur. Sqn.
Morse Field, Hawaii.....	2 May 1941	1,687,530	2 Bomb. Sqns.
Barking Sands, Kauai.....	2 May 1941	1,772,220	2 Bomb. Sqns.
Parker Ranch, Hawaii.....	2 May 1941	1,992,600	1 Bomb. Sqn.
Lanai Airport.....	(1)	1,990,000	1 Pur. Sqn.
Burns, Field, Kauai.....	(1)	640,000	1 Hv. Rcn. Sqn.
Haleiwa, Oahu.....	(1)	450,000	

¹ Projects will be ready for mailing this week.

The above projects were summarized in radio and letter to General Marshall 2 May 1941 (AG 600.12 (6-10-41)). The radio also included request for a blanket allotment of \$10,000,000 to cover immediate needs of this department for fortifications, bombproofs, and other construction.

[29]

Information furnished by: 9th Ind (1-25-41) AG 662.1 (10-7-40) 5th Ind (4-2-41) AG 662.1 (2-6-41) 4th Ind (4-3-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 1st Ind (4-17-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 1st Ind (5-12-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 4th Ind (5-22-41) AG 662.1 (2-4-41) 5th Ind (5-9-41) AG 611 (11-8-40) 4th Ind (6-4-41) AG 662.1 (4-14-41) Copy of 3d Ind (5-15-41) AG 633.5 (4-17-41) will be sent to Haw Dept (G-4 - Capt Horton). Advised by 6th Ind (5-12-41) AG 662.1 (2-5-41) re funds for QM gas storage.

5th Ind (5-9-41) to AG 611 Haw (11-8-40) informed of status of funds. \$50,000 for roads and \$300,000 for RR in FY 1942 (SCD). \$900,000 for roads in FY 1943. Will be allotted when available.

By 1st Ind (4-16-41) to AG 600.12 (3-17-41) the WD requested justification of additional funds. No reply to date but \$613,000 tentatively included in FY 1943 Est. to complete project.

AG 600.12 (4-4-41) Under study—G-4

Action, based on approved Memo Ch/Staff (WPD 4483 (5-13-41), taken by 4th Ind (5-31-41) to AG 600.12 (2-9-41)

b. Bombproof Construction.

(1) The various bombproof projects which were submitted to the War Department in February have been answered either directly or indirectly but no definite statement has been received as to the funds which will be available for the construction of the approved projects. General Marshall has stated that funds in the amount of \$3,000,000.00 have been tentatively set up for the bombproofing requirements in this department but what proportion, if any, of this money is ear-marked for the casemating of the major caliber seacoast batteries is not known.

c. Roads and Trails.

(1) The last revision of the military roads and trails program was returned to the War Department by 4th Indorsement dated 4 April 1941 requesting immediate release of funds in the amount of \$1,249,620 for the construction of necessary roads, trails and railroads. Information has been received that \$300,000 is included in 1942 estimates for the construction of the railroad items of the program but there has been no release of or information on funds for the remainder of the items.

d. Ammunition Storage.

(1) Final estimates for the magazine construction at Schofield Barracks were submitted to the War Department 17 March 1941 with a request for funds in the amount of \$1,203,900. Last War Department advice has been that \$937,000 has been included in the 1942 estimates for Schofield Barracks and Aliamanu magazines. This amount is inadequate by approximately \$600,000 (\$267,000 for Schofield Barracks and \$335,000 for Aliamanu).

(2) Hickam Field. Letter submitted 4 April 1941 requested funds in the amount of \$148,600 to complete igloo magazine construction at Hickam Field for the storage of bombs.

c. Bunkering for airplanes.

(1) Letter submitted 19 February requested funds in the amount of \$1,565,600 for the construction of bunkers for the pursuit and bombardment planes at Wheeler and Hickam Fields respectively.

Action by 4th Ind (6-9-41) AG 600.12 (4-5-41)

Action by 4th Ind (5-20-41) to AG 600.12 (4-5-41)

Action by 4th Ind (6-6-41) to AG 600.12 (3-22-41)

No record of request.

Priority on cable delivery has been given Haw. Dept. Cable will be sent as rapidly as procured. Signal Officer, Haw. Dept, being so notified. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

f. Mobilization Housing.

(1) Letter submitted 5 April 1941 requested funds in the amount of \$250,000 for the purchase of kitchen equipment for the approved mobilization housing program at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

(2) Letter submitted 5 April 1941 requesting funds in the amount of \$170,000 for the construction of the Headquarters Building for the Hawaiian Air Force.

(3) Letter submitted 22 March 1941 requesting funds in the amount of \$113,500 for the construction of 5 warehouses and 1 theatre at Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

(4) In addition to the foregoing, the District Engineer is submitting this data to this headquarters his final estimate for the additional funds required to complete the present authorized mobilization construction program at Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields. The additional funds required are \$1,256,647, and should be asked for immediately.

Signal

'1. *Cable.* All cable for Command and Fire Control Cable System Projects now on hand will be installed by 31 July, 1941, with the exception of that for Project SCD-1120, Mail to Station "U". 100 pair cable for projects SCD-1115, 1116, 1117, 1119 and 200 pair cable for Project SCD-1118 will not be shipped until after 1 September, 1941. Shipment of conduit and part of 100 pair lead covered cable for Project SCD-1126 has been promised for 1 July 1941. This will permit the installation of the conduit and manhole system on SCD-1126 between 1 July and the arrival of cable for the other projects. However, this work will not be sufficient to keep our trained crews working during that period. Shortage of labor and higher wages in other governmental departments and in contract work will result in our men going to other work if forced to lay off due to lack of cable. All possible steps should be taken to advance the delivery date of part of the 100 or 200 pair cable now on order so that our construction force can be kept intact.

Issue automatic. CG Haw Dept being so informed. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

Signal Off., Haw Dept. being furnished information requested. (Ch SO—Maj Lanahan)

Project requires Congressional approval. \$306,300 included in Req. Est FY 1942 eliminated by Bureau of Budget. Hem now in Tent. Est FY 1943. Ch/SO asking for earlier consideration. CG Haw Dept will be informed. (Ch/SO—Maj Lanahan)

2. *Teletype Machines.* The Hawaiian Air Force has a dire need for more teletype machines. Information is requested as to whether the teletype equipment now authorized on the TBA for aviation units in this Department will be issued automatically or whether requisitions should be submitted. A tabulation based on the aviation unit now stationed in Hawaiian Department indicates that the following are authorized on TBA:

Perforators.....	32
Model 15 WX.....	6
Model 15 Standard.....	18
Model 19.....	16
Reperforator.....	32
Switchboard Teletype 6 Line.....	20

It is noted in TBA that the peacetime allotment of the last item is by rental only. If this is to be issued automatically, information is requested in what quantities and at what intervals it will be shipped.

3. *Schofield Barracks Telephone Exchange.*

Present condition of this telephone exchange is such that it is impossible to give good communications. A new telephone exchange is absolutely essential. A project for this purpose is in Washington at the present time. Information is desired as to when this project will be approved and whether it would be possible to place this exchange in a bombproof shelter to provide adequate protection at all times so that it will work for both administrative and tactical purposes. Authority to bombproof Hut Y, which is adjacent to the Schofield Telephone Exchange has been received and the work is to start in the near future. Hut Y is so designed that at a later date the new Schofield Exchange could be placed adjacent to it and bombproofed, without any additional changes to Hut Y other than cutting through of two doors. In the project for the Schofield Barracks Exchange, \$40,000.00 was requested for a new building. That amount with an additional \$25,000.00 would provide a building underground and properly bombproofed. The combination of these two units in bombproof shelter is considered highly desirable.

See para. *e* below.

Action by radio (6-9-41)

Officers being procured by WD and Corps Areas as rapidly as possible.

No record of request. Xth Sig Bn eliminated from authorized War Reinforcements on recommendation CG Haw Dept (AG 320.2, 11-4-40).

See remark para. *d* above.

4. *Data re urgent personnel needs for Signal Corps.*

a. Signal Bn T/O 11-15, 1 Nov 1940, comprising Hq. Co—construction and operations Companies.

b. T/O (2) sections of Signal Depot Company, T/O 11-107, 11/1/40, (1 Section—Repair—1 Section—Storage and Issue.)

c. Commissioned personnel for Hawaiian Air Force. Signal Corps activities on duty with Hawaiian Air Force are short 10 Reserve officers. Radio to TAG transmitted a week or ten days ago requesting they be furnished prior to June.

d. Short 14 Reserve officers for Signal Corps activities *other than those with A. C.* Request has been submitted to War Department requesting them.

e. Action now being initiated requesting authority to activate the following units and to increase the 9th Signal Service Co. from 230 men to 320.

1 Signal Bn.

1 Signal Depot Co. (2 Sections only)

The most urgent commissioned personnel problem at present is to bring the HAF Signal Corps officers up to full strength of 20. They are urgently in need of at least 5 Captains to command their Company units, consisting of:

307 Sig. Co. Air Wing—W. F.

324 Sig. Co. Air Wing—H. F.

328 Sig. Co. AWN H. F.

53 Sig Mtc Co.

The enlisted men and units, etc., are urgently required and are essential to facilitate the installation-operation and maintenance of wire and radio communications systems and the Command and Fire Control cable system, and to take care of the additional abnormal load placed on all Signal Corps activities due to current emergency.

Food.

1. At the present time the only War Department project in which this Department is primarily interested is the effort being made through the Governor's committee (Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball) in Washington for the purchase by the Emergency Procurement Management of Supplies of essential food such as:

Letter S/W to Mr. Chester C. Davis, Advisory Commission to Council of National Defense, April 10, 1941, endorsed plan for stockpile of foodstuffs in Haw Dept. (WPD 3915-12, 4-10-41)

Rice,
Wheat flour and products,
Canned Milk
Fats and Oils,

and their shipment without delay as emergency food supplies to Hawaii. At the present time it appears that Mr. Warner has been successful in making arrangements for the purchase of two million dollars worth of this food through the office of the Emergency Procurement Management. The thing which is holding up the project is the lack of storage warehouses here.

The War Department is apparently ready to certify that this storage is necessary as an emergency defense measure if any private interests here will undertake to put up the necessary warehouses under a plan to amortize the entire cost of the warehouses in five years.

At present the Hawaiian Pineapple Company is considering the project but apparently is holding back on final arrangements because the Government will retain an equity in the property equal to the rent paid. Until this obstacle can be overcome the project is still in the air.

2. It is believed that the War Department recognizes the storage of emergency food supplies here as of paramount importance. It is only necessary that the various governmental agencies concerned in the project be kept informed from time to time of the War Department's interest in the subject.

/s/ Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Also to be added to Engineer List, Project for Anti-Sabotage Protection submitted by letter 15 May requesting funds in the amount of \$240,000 for installation of protective fences and other guards against sabotage.

AG 600.12 (5-15-41) Under Study—G-4

No record of request.

None available at present.

Rec'd—W. P. D. May 27, 1941

Facilities for bathing, cooking; toilet facilities, mess halls, etc., for camps for convalescents and evacuation for women and children to be developed at regimental recreation camps in time of peace, so that they may be maintained for future use: \$100,000.

(In handwriting) 90 mm AA guns are necessary for defense of Pearl Harbor.

[34A]

A. ARMY

Morse Field: 1 paved runway 3,400' long, 300' wide, Gasoline storage 450,000 gallons, construction for 2 bombardment squadrons, total estimated cost \$1,687,530.00.

Bellows Field, Oahu:

1 runway 300' wide, 3,400' long.

1 runway 50.0' long, 300' wide.

Buildings, 4

1 night bombardment squadron

1 observation squadron

1 pursuit squadron

Gasoline storage, aqua system, 600,000 gallons.

Cast, \$2,542,900.00

New Pursuit Field: 3 runways each 5000' long, paved width 200', gasoline storage of 900,000 gal. aqua system, housing facilities for 1 pursuit group, cost if land is leased \$4,668,950.00, if land is purchased \$4,938,950.00

Parker Ranch, Hawaii: 3 runways 5000' long, 200' wide, gasoline storage for 300,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment group, estimated cost \$1,992,600.00

Lanai Airport: 2 runways each 5000' long, paved width 300', gasoline storage 200,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost \$1,990,000.00

Barking Sands: 2 runways 5000' long, 200' wide, housing and facilities for 2 bombardment squadrons, gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons, estimated cost \$1,772,220.00

B. Following fields to be improved by Civil Aeronautics Authority. Army construction necessary for housing and other facilities

Molokai: 1 runway 31000' long, 200' wide; 1 runway 4200' long, 200' wide, gasoline storage 350,000 gallons, buildings and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost \$407,600.00

Hilo Airport: 3 runways each 200' wide respectively 3000', 4000' and 4500' long, gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment squadron, estimated cost \$670,140.00

Burn Field: 2 runways 200' wide, 3200 and 2600 feet long, storage for 200,000 gallons gasoline, housing and facilities for 1 heavy reconnaissance squadron, estimated cost \$640,000.00

C. ARMY

Haleiwa Airport: Flying condition to be improved as follows: Construction 1 runway 4000' by 300', installation of 100,000 gallons gasoline storage, no housing facilities except for small permanent detachment, estimated cost \$450,000.00.

Housing for 1 company of National Guard to be provided at all airports except Hilo where 2 companies will be housed and excepting Haleiwa where none will be built.

[35]

MAY 29, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I know that you will not have time to look over a detailed account of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like to have a birds eye view of what we did and the purpose back of it.

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one days fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands

and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise.

Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to complete the issue.

The second phase consisted of the completion of our plans and the organization of the ground, including the construction of Field Fortifications. Naturally this work should have been completed before any warning of enemy landing was received. However, it would have been impossible to actually construct field fortifications until we got authority for the leasing of the ground. Cost of leasing of the ground is going to be extremely low. The whole command dug diligently upon them day and night. We accomplished a very great deal and I believe shall be able to complete all necessary field fortifications soon after July 1st. Fifty-five bunkers for pursuit planes were actually constructed at Wheeler Field. To my mind the construction of the field fortifications are extremely important since our plans are so intimately tied in with the organization of the ground. My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following:

1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.
2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.
3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.

[36] 4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.

5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counterattack.

We have received enough of our new transportation so that with proper planning I am convinced that we can move all of our reserves. With the completion of our field fortifications we shall make small changes in our plan so as to make more reserves available.

Third phase, the maneuver proper—Repelling of a Serious Attack. The situation was based on the theory that a serious enemy attack against Oahu would be possible only under the following conditions:

Our fleet would be either absent or very greatly inferior.

Our air force would be destroyed or very greatly inferior.

Five enemy landings were made. The Navy furnished ships to simulate enemy transports and enemy naval ships. They did not make actual landings as the Marines were not available at that time. The 27th Infantry was employed to represent the enemy, being sent to landing places by train and motors. Landings were made at widely dispersed places on the island. The situation was developed so that our forces were rather widely dispersed in driving off the four minor landings and had to be moved rapidly for a general counter-attack when the main enemy threat developed. The situation was built up by the destruction of our large guns so that the Harbor Defense troops in the later phase of the exercise manned 3" and 6" secondary armament which are not normally manned on account of the lack of personnel. In the final phase the Harbor Defense troops were required to take over one sector of beach defense to release Infantry for the main attack. Likewise air personnel which were available through almost complete destruction of our planes were used for anti-sabotage work and finally to take over a short sector of beach defense. 155-mm guns and Antiaircraft batteries were moved from their usual positions and missions and acted as Army artillery in support of the main attack.

I feel that we put across the necessity for organization of the ground and for mobility. Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our air defense command, the construction of division, wing and air defense C. P.'s. which have been authorized, and probably for the completion of the 13 weeks training of the selectees which will be called on July 1st.

I am sending under separate cover a few photographs of field fortifications.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[37]

JULY 3, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: I have examined the proposal outlined in your letter of June 7th concerning the establishment of a training camp in the Koolaus Mountains which could be used as a convalescent and recreational center, and possibly as an evacuation area.

With funds at hand or in sight we are having difficulty in satisfying requirements for troops less fortunately situated with respect to recreational and training facilities. The proximity of the mountains to Schofield Barracks and the ideal recreational facilities of the beaches on Oahu place your project relatively in priority. Consequently, I believe that favorable consideration of your request must be declined.

The official communication is being returned to your headquarters through regular channels.

Faithfully yours,

[stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[38]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
 July 11, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On April 14th I submitted a letter recommending the establishment of a new air field between Kipapa and Waikakalua gulches on the Island of Oahu. This field is more important to us than any of the other fields recommended as they were on outlying islands. This field was selected after a very thorough search of the whole island on the part of the Air Corps. General Martin considers it the only suitable place on the Island of Oahu. I agree with him fully. On July 4th I received a wire from the War Department stating that this site for the field was not approved and recommending the reconsideration of Kahuku Point. On July 7th I replied to the wire stating that I considered Kahuku Point impossible from a tactical point of view owing to the fact that it had practically no protection from Harbor Defenses and would be subject to raids by small landing parties. This data I forwarded to the Adjutant General a complete study of all air fields considered, with a map showing existing Army and Navy Fields, as well as those considered and discarded. I am enclosing copies of all the correspondence, as well as a copy of the map, in order that it may be immediately available to you. I consider it important that we get a decision on this matter at the earliest practical moment since General Martin tells me that planes for the 15th Group may arrive at almost any time.

I am afraid that someone in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps who has been out here is considering Kahuku Point purely from the point of view of technical flying and is giving no consideration whatsoever to its tactical location. I would not bother you with this unless I felt that it was a matter of prime importance.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
 WALTER C. SHORT.

[39]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
 25 July 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Continuing our cooperation with the Navy I have arranged with Admiral Kimmel to have all Navy air fields on Hawaii and outlying islands extended wherever possible so as to provide for landing of B-17s. With very few exceptions this is going to be practicable.

I am enclosing copies of Admiral Kimmel's instructions on this matter and also copies of our orders and Naval orders to effect the use of Navy fields by Army planes and Army fields by Navy planes. The matter is a little more simple from the point of view of the Army than the Navy inasmuch as we can use their bombs but our bombs cannot be used by the Navy without an additional attachment.

We are now experimenting to see if we can manufacture locally such an attachment. When the fields are completed at Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston I think it will perhaps be a good idea to send a squadron of B-17s to each island. I am sure that we can arrange with Admiral Kimmel for the stationing of destroyers to guarantee the safety of the flight.

Tomorrow we are carrying out an attack exercise with tanks, infantry and artillery, supported by thirty-four Navy Dive Bombers. It is the first time I have had an opportunity to see the use of dive bombers directly in support of ground troops and I think this is perhaps true of all the officers here. I am giving an opportunity to as great a number of officers as possible to see this exercise.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[40]

8-19-41

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
*Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.*

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Your letter of July 11, has been received recommending the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for the 15th Pursuit Group. The advantages and disadvantages of each site have been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the Kahuku Point Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field sufficiently to result in my decision to establish the base on Kahuku Point.

The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision:

a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field—Kipapa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups in an area subject to the same adverse weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions. Selection of the Kahuku Point site places one group in a location where relatively favorable weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area.

b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield Barracks—Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present conditions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traffic in the interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably aggravate this situation.

I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and [41] accordingly, will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. I hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may have previously established to any part of the area involved.

With best personal regards,

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

[42]

OCTOBER 10, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
*Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.*

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific pur-

pose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

[43]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,
October 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised.

Very sincerely

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.

[44]

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and [45] have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situation.

Faithfully yours,

/S/ G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.